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AUTHORITARIANISM AND COGNITIVE 
POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
This study analyses the linkage between authoritarianism and 
three indicators that describe one’s general cognitive orientation 
towards the world of politics: political knowledge, general interest 
in politics, and interest in the election campaign. Individuals high 
in authoritarianism are hypothesized to be less politically com-
petent and less interested in politics, due to their resistance to 
adopting new information and to changing the adopted beliefs. 
This hypothesis is based on the classical description of the au-
thoritarian personality, but it has not been adequately empirically 
verified yet. The data are taken from a post-election public opinion 
survey conducted in 2012 after the presidential and parliamentary 
elections, on a random sample of voting age citizens of Serbia 
(N = 1568). The results show that authoritarianism and the level 
of political knowledge are significantly and negatively correlated, 
even after controlling for the basic socio-demographic variables. 
The intensity of political interest is not significantly correlated with 
authoritarianism. Additional comparison of the misinformed and 
uninformed groups (those who provided incorrect answers, and 
those who answered “don’t know”, respectively) did not support 
the view that authoritarian persons are more inclined to errone-
ously guess an answer than to simply say “don’t know”. The study 
concludes that the association between political knowledge and 
authoritarianism is based on deeper psychological roots, while 
the (lack of) association with political interest is likely to be con-
text-dependent.
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Since the publishing of the seminal work on authoritarian personality by 
Adorno and associates (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), 
authoritarianism has become one of the most influential concepts in political 
psychology. The literature on authoritarianism describes highly authoritarian in-
dividuals as prejudiced and intolerant, prone to antidemocratic, non-egalitarian 
ideologies. Numerous empirical studies have shown the link between authoritari-
anism and ethnic (Adorno et al., 1950; Brown, 1965) and non-ethnic prejudice 
(Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993), nationalism (Todosijević, 2013), the militarist 
view on conflict resolution (Doty, Winter, Peterson, & Kemmelmeier, 1997), pro-
capitalist attitudes, denial of freedom and human rights etc. (Altemeyer, 1981, 
1988, 1996; McFarland, 2010; Meloen, 1993). In a nutshell, the extant evidence 
shows that authoritarian individuals hold specific views on social and political 
issues, which consequently determines their political preferences and behaviour. 
The correlates of authoritarianism have mostly been sought (and found) in 
the field of attitudes towards various social and political issues (e.g., McFarland, 
2010; Meloen, 1993). The relationship between authoritarianism and political 
cognition is, however, an under-researched area, although the topic is both theo-
retically and practically important. The literature on authoritarianism contains 
numerous references to specific features of political cognition and involvement 
among the highly authoritarian individuals that require empirical verification and 
further theoretical development. Yet, as Peterson et al. (Peterson, Duncan, & Pang, 
2002) complained some time ago, “To date […], no one has examined the amount 
of political knowledge possessed by someone scoring high on authoritarianism.” 
(pp. 99−100, emphasis in original). Peterson et al. (2002) reported a negative as-
sociation between the right-wing authoritarianism and both political knowledge 
and political interest among American university students. 
The situation in the research field has not changed much meanwhile. The 
studies on authoritarianism and political involvement and interest are still scarce. 
In particular, research evidence from different political and cultural contexts, as 
well as the studies on large, probability samples, would be most welcome. This 
paper’s contribution is in providing the lacking empirical evidence, using reliable 
measurement instruments and a large, probability-based sample. The evidence 
comes from Serbia, a still-democratizing country, with recent experience with au-
thoritarian politics.
Authoritarianism and political involvement: The theoretical 
framework
“The Authoritarian Personality” (Adorno et al., 1950) contains numerous ref-
erences to the authoritarians’ view of the political world. Although Adorno and 
associates treated authoritarianism as a personality concept, and “personality 
may be regarded as a determinant of ideological preferences” (Adorno et al., 1950, 
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p. 5, italics in original), throughout the pages of “The Authoritarian Personality” 
there are explicit references to prominent political cynicism and aversion towards 
politics and politicians, as well as to political ignorance of highly authoritarian 
individuals. For instance, the interviews revealed, “widespread ignorance and 
confusion (…) in political matters, a phenomenon which might well surpass what 
even a skeptical observer should have anticipated” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 658). 
Moreover, a kind of an anti-political orientation is observed among the au-
thoritarian respondents. Politicians and bureaucrats were perceived as “usurpers, 
parasites, know nothing about the people (…). The wealth of statements against 
bureaucrats and politicians in our interview material is tremendous.” (Adorno et 
al., 1950, pp. 693−694). Yet, it is not known to what extent such description, that 
is, political ignorance and disinterest in politics, fits the contemporary authori-
tarianism.
Authoritarian individuals appear as “apolitical animals” in Altemeyer’s out-
line of the right-wing authoritarianism as well. Altemeyer (1988) corroborates 
Adorno et al.’s view that authoritarianism leads to obedience to the authorities 
perceived to be legitimate (i.e., political passivity). However, he also emphasizes 
that right-wing authoritarianism “connects only moderately to the political pref-
erences of ordinary people” (Altemeyer, 2007, p. 197), thus implying not only the 
lack of political interest, but also political incompetence – the difficulty in connect-
ing one’s attitudes with political choices.
In some other conceptions, authoritarianism has been equaled with the qual-
ity of person’s cognitive functioning. Rokeach (1960) argued that dogmatism, a 
form of a belief system structure, could be understood as the general authoritari-
anism. Dogmatic persons are described as closed-minded, as individuals whose 
processing of political information is suboptimal. This line of reasoning empha-
sizes the importance not of the content of one’s beliefs, but of the cognitive struc-
ture – the biased acquisition, selection, and interpretation of information. This 
view is supported by empirical evidence that shows that more authoritarian/
conservative individuals are less politically sophisticated (Tetlock, 1983), think 
less analytically (Talhelm et al., 2015) and show low cognitive complexity (Hinze, 
Doster, & Joe, 1997). Likewise, recent research on conservatism as motivated so-
cial cognition (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, & Sulloway, 2003) 
also points in the direction of authoritarian political views being associated with 
the biased processing of political information.
In Adorno et al.’s conceptualization, authoritarianism is a personality dispo-
sition, and therefore causally prior to consequent deficient political knowledge 
and interest. The causal order could, however, be conceived differently. The au-
thors themselves recognized that “there is a reason to believe that ignorance itself 
works in favour of general reactionary trends” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 339). The 
claim is nicely illustrated with some interesting findings that Gordon Allport dis-
cusses in his classic work on prejudice (Allport, 1954). He argues of prejudiced 
people as being afraid to say “don’t know”. They need for definiteness and feel 
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secure when they “know” the answer, even if it means making erroneous guesses. 
Those higher on authoritarianism would demand a clear-cut structure of the so-
cial world; they are intolerant of uncertainty and “not knowing”, even if the al-
ternative is an inadequate piece of information (Allport, 1954). Put simply, peo-
ple higher on authoritarianism could be expected to be rather misinformed than 
uninformed, the difference which has evidenced political relevance (Kuklinski, 
Quirk, Jerit, Schweider, & Reich, 2000).
Similarly, Lipset (1959) argued that the firmly established link between low 
socioeconomic status and high authoritarian predispositions is moderated by the 
lack of political sophistication. The less sophisticated the individual, “the more 
likely he is to favour a simplified and demonological view of politics” (Lipset, 
1959, p. 492). Put simply, the lack of information, among other things, predispos-
es a person to view politics in simplistic, “black and white” terms and to prefer ex-
tremist movements, quick and easy solutions to social problems – in other words, 
makes the person more prone to an authoritarian political outlook. A sort of a 
cognitive approach to authoritarianism or, as others suggested (Meloen, 1996), 
the lack-of-cognitive-understanding approach to the study of authoritarianism 
could be quite appropriate as well.
Indeed, if we look at political knowledge, it is typically described as some-
thing antithetical to authoritarianism. Numerous studies have shown that in-
creased political knowledge is related to some of the most prominent features of 
a democratic political outlook, such as more active participation in various po-
litical activities (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Inglehart, 1979; Klingemann, 1979; 
Krampen, 2000; Pavlović, 2012; 2013a) and increased political tolerance (Delli 
Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Pavlović, 2012). Some argue that political knowledge is 
“to democratic politics what money is to economics: it is the currency of citizen-
ship“ (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 8). Knowledgeable individuals are supposed 
to make more informed and rational political decisions, to monitor political pro-
cess more closely and “press” political authorities to be more accountable and 
responsible. Such activities are quite the opposite of what is to be expected of an 
authoritarian personality. 
Political knowledge and interest are often viewed as key components of dem-
ocratic political competences, while political ignorance and indifference are op-
posite (e.g., Dekker, 1996). Furthermore, political knowledge and political interest 
are usually treated as measures of cognitive mobilization (Dalton 1984, 2007), a 
notion used in describing the changing trends in political behaviour. It is argued 
that, due to rising levels of education, media proliferation, and information access, 
people became more cognitively mobilized. They are well equipped with skills 
and resources to make their own independent political decisions without relying 
on affective or habitual cues (Dalton, 1984, 2007; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). 
The socio-psychological research on cognitive closure additionally corroborates 
the view that cognitive factors are causally prior to authoritarianism. For instance, 
Chirumbolo concluded that “authoritarianism seems to mediate the influence of 
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need for closure on political orientation” (2001, p. 603, abstr.). Likewise, Roets and 
Van Hiel (2006) also report that right-wing authoritarianism mediates between cog-
nitive closure and conservatism. It is important to note here that the need for cogni-
tive closure refers to non-political cognitive functioning. In this paper, we deal with 
explicitly political knowledge and interest, and therefore authoritarianism is more 
likely to function as a precursor of specific forms of political involvement.
The present research
Regardless of the causal priority, various approaches briefly outlined above 
all suggest that authoritarianism should be associated with lower political knowl-
edge and the lack of interest in politics. The present study is aimed at analysing 
the relationship between authoritarianism and three key indicators of cognitive, 
political involvement: political knowledge, general political interest, and interest 
in the election campaign. Thus, we will focus on the link between authoritarian-
ism and a general cognitive orientation towards the political world. 
In the single existing study that addressed the same problem, Peterson et 
al. (2002) reported significant negative correlations between the right-wing au-
thoritarianism (RWA) and political knowledge among American college students. 
Those high on the right-wing authoritarianism possessed the less general political 
knowledge and fewer pieces of specific information related to the 2000 US Presi-
dential elections (see Peterson, Smirles, & Wentworth, 1997). Similarly, interest in 
politics was lower in the highly authoritarian group. The individuals who scored 
high on authoritarianism were described as persons alienated and excluded from 
the political process, which they perceived in terms of rigid categories and imper-
meable constructs (Peterson et al., 2002). 
Our hypothesis about political knowledge resembles the one advanced by Pe-
terson et al. (2002). Given the cognitive rigidity associated with authoritarianism, 
we would expect that high authoritarians are prone to endorsing the biased views 
of the political world, relatively less likely to change their incorrect beliefs and to 
adopt new information that may affect their already existing opinions. The associ-
ation of authoritarianism with political interest is somewhat less straightforward. 
As suggested by Peterson et al. (2002), the cognitive closure may predispose one 
not to seek additional information (given the pre-existing beliefs), and therefore 
to express lower political interest. Analogously, individuals low in authoritarian-
ism, who are known to show higher openness to experience (e.g., McCrae, 1996), 
could be expected to show more political interest as well. Peterson et al. (1997, 
2002), for instance, provided evidence of a negative association between authori-
tarianism and political interest.
However, they also proposed that “the lack of any positive relationships be-
tween authoritarianism and political interest may indicate that people scoring 
high on RWA are rather apathetic about politics until social threats begin to accu-
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mulate” (Peterson et al., 2002, p. 107). Indeed, a recent political upheaval across 
Europe showed that right-wing extremist (and therefore authoritarian) groups 
and organizations were the first to mobilize and give voice to their negative at-
titudes towards the Syrian (and other) refugees. Hence, we expect to obtain evi-
dence of a negative association between political interest and authoritarianism, 
but bearing in mind the possibility that authoritarianism may be associated with 
attentiveness to certain political issues contrary evidence seems possible as well. 
To summarize, we add to the existing knowledge in several ways. First, we 
provide fresh empirical evidence on an important but understudied problem. 
In fact, we aim to provide contextualized evidence, which is particularly needed 
since the main hypotheses are formulated in a general manner, i.e., not restricted 
to a specific political and cultural context. Of particular importance is that the 
analysis is based on the data obtained from a large, national level probability sam-
ple. Peterson et al. (2002) used small psychology student samples – as is typical 
for much of social psychology research. Their respondents, the students of the 
average age of 18, were certainly not representative of general population either 
in political knowledge (should be much better informed) or in authoritarianism 
(psychology students should be low). The authors themselves acknowledged this 
problem, and suggested “collecting data from people of diverse ages and educa-
tion levels” (Peterson et al., 2002, p. 108). They also suggested the need to ana-
lyse the authoritarianism-political interest association in larger, more diverse 
samples, which would be important for studying political interest. They speculate 
that highly authoritarian individuals might, in fact, be a particularly politically in-
volved group, but such individuals might be rare in the usual psychology student 
samples. 
Finally, we devote some attention to the role of education and age in the rela-
tionship between authoritarianism and political involvement. Namely, it is known 
that the latter two variables are associated with education and age. Hence, the 
association between them might be spurious. For this reason, we compare zero-
order associations with those obtained after controlling for the influence of age 
and education.
Research of the outlined problems gains additional relevance in an unstable 
political context, such as Serbia. In a number of studies, authoritarianism proved 
to be an important factor in understanding political attitudes and behaviour in 
this context, and is often viewed as a major obstacle in the process of democ-
ratization of the society. For example, it strongly differentiates the supporters 
of main political parties in Serbia (Kuzmanović, 2010; Pantić & Pavlović, 2009; 
Todosijević, 2006, 2013; Todosijević, Pavlović, & Komar, 2015) and negatively in-
fluences the support for democracy in general (Pavlović, 2013b, 2014). If those 
higher on authoritarianism are indeed more cognitively involved in politics, then 
authoritarianism itself can be viewed as an important driving force of political be-
haviour and a “threat” to democracy. Still, if, as expected, authoritarianism leads 
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to political withdrawal and disinterest, its role in political behaviour should be 
understood quite differently and limited to making them passive.
Method
Participants
The data for the current study come from the Serbian Public Opinion Survey 
2012 (SPOS). The SPOS is a post-election survey of public opinion conducted after 
the May 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia. The study was 
designed to be a nationally representative, high-quality survey, focused on a broad 
set of attitudes, preferences, and opinions relevant to Serbian political life. It was 
based on a random sample with multiple stages of selection. The survey was con-
ducted using the computer-assisted personal interviewing mode. Data collection 
began on December 21, 2012, and ran through to February 10, 2013. The sam-
ple included 1568 voting age Serbian citizens. There were slightly more females 
(51.6%), than males (48.4%) in the sample and the average age was 52 (SD = 
17.49). Approximately one-fourth of the sample (26.6%) consists of respondents 
with elementary educational level; 56.5% of respondents finished secondary lev-
el of education, while 16.8% graduated at the faculty. Average monthly household 
income was in a range from 30000–39999 RSD. The statistical analyses presented 
below include a combined sampling and demographic weight, which means that 
the analysed sample is representative of the Serbian adult population in terms of 
age, gender, education, and urban-rural residence.
Data and measures
Authoritarianism. A short, six items scale, which is formulated on the basis 
of the well-known F scale (Adorno et al., 1950) and the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 
1988) was used as a measure of authoritarianism. Similar scales were used and 
validated in previous studies (Pavlović, 2014; Todosijević, 2006). Each item was 
followed by a five-point Likert scale. Authoritarianism was operationalized as the 
first principal component (38% of the total explained variance, α = .65). All items 
have shown positive factor loadings on the first component (see Appendix A, Ta-
ble A1). Higher scores imply higher authoritarianism. 
Political knowledge. Four multiple-choice question knowledge test was 
used to measure the level of respondents’ political knowledge. The respondents 
answered by choosing one of the four offered answers to the following questions 
(correct answers are provided in parentheses): (1) Who was the Finance Minister 
before the recent election? (Mirko Cvetković), (2) What was the unemployment 
rate in Serbia as of April 2012? (25.5%), (3) Which party or coalition came in sec-
ond in seats in the National Assembly? (“Izbor za bolji život” – Boris Tadić), and 
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(4) Who is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations? (Ban Ki-moon). 
These four questions cover the area of politics often used in the operationaliza-
tion and measurement of political knowledge – the knowledge of factual politics 
and the knowledge of foreign affairs (e.g., Delli Karpini & Keeter, 1993, 1996). 
Each respondent could provide a correct, incorrect or don’t know the answer. 
The number of correct answers was treated as a measure of the level of political 
knowledge, with higher scores implying more political knowledge. As such, the 
incorrect and “don’t know” answers were treated as a single response category2. 
In order not to make the main analysis misleading, besides analysing the rela-
tionship between authoritarianism and the level of political knowledge, we also 
analysed the differences in the authoritarianism level between the respondents 
who gave one of the three possible answers to each political knowledge question 
(correct/incorrect/don’t know). Additionally, we analysed the differences in the 
level of authoritarianism between three political knowledge groups of respond-
ents on political knowledge test in general – those who systematically gave all of 
the correct answers (the informed group), those who gave only wrong answers 
(the misinformed group) and those who gave a DK answer to all of the questions 
(the uninformed group). In that way, it was possible to analyse the difference in 
being misinformed and uninformed in regard to authoritarianism in more detail. 
Interest in politics. General interest in politics is assessed by the following 
question: “How interested would you say you are in politics – are you very inter-
ested, quite interested, hardly interested, or not at all interested?”. The respond-
ents made their estimation on a four-point scale (1 = Very interested, 2 = Quite 
interested, 3 = Hardly interested, 4 = Not at all interested). The scale was recoded 
so that higher scores imply higher interest in politics.
Campaign following. Specific interest in an election campaign is measured 
by the following question: “Some people don’t pay much attention to political 
campaigns. How closely did you follow the election campaign – not closely at all, 
not very closely, fairly closely, or very closely?”. The respondents made their es-
timation on a four-point scale (1 = not closely at all, 2 = not very closely, 3 = fairly 
closely, 4 = very closely). This is treated as a measure of the specific, up-to-date 
interest in politics. This question, as well as the political knowledge questions 
and interest in politics, has been extensively tested cross-nationally, since they 
form a part of the Module 4 questionnaire of the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems project (CSES; www.cses.org), which was an integral part of the question-
naire used in our study.
2  Some methodological issues regarding the status of “Don’t know” answers are heavily debated in the 
literature. Some argue that when DK answers are included and offered to the respondents (even encour-
aged by formal instructions etc.), the test scores reflect not just political knowledge but the personality-
related propensity to guess as well (Mondak, 1999, 2001). This implies that DK and incorrect answers 
should not be treated as a single category (Mondak & Anderson, 2004). However, these methodological 
issues are beyond the scope of this paper. In our survey, DK answers were neither offered nor encouraged, 
but were registered by interviewers when spontaneously given by the respondent.
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Socio-demographic variables. The set of control variables includes meas-
ures of education, age, and income. Age is measured in years since birth. Educa-
tional level is measured in 8 degrees, following the International Standard Clas-
sification of Education, provided by the UNESCO (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
2012). Household income level is operationalized via an eleven-point income 
scale (from 1 = 0−9999 RSD to 11 = 100000 RSD and more). 
Results
In determining the relationship between authoritarianism and cognitive 
political involvement we proceed as follows. We will first present the inter-cor-
relations of all the variables in the study. Then we will focus on the correlation 
between authoritarianism and political knowledge, general and specific political 
interest, after controlling for age, education, and income. In this step of the analy-
sis, we will additionally stress the differences between being misinformed (i.e., 
giving an incorrect answer) and uninformed (i.e., giving “don’t know” answer) in 
relation to authoritarianism using ANOVA and post-hoc tests. 
Correlation coefficients between variables included in the analysis are shown 
in Table 1. Concerning the relationship between authoritarianism and political 
variables, significant correlation coefficient has been registered only between 
authoritarianism and political knowledge. The relationship is negative – those 
higher on authoritarianism are less knowledgeable of politics and vice versa, as 
expected. To each of the political knowledge questions, those lower on authori-
tarianism gave more correct answers than those higher on authoritarianism. The 
association is weakest in the case of the unemployment question, and strongest 
for the UN Secretary General item. 
The results also show that one’s authoritarianism level is not systematically 
related to general and specific interest in politics. In other words, there is no dif-
ference in the levels of authoritarianism between those politically indifferent and 
those who are politically interested. 
In accordance with the previous studies, the three socio-demographic vari-
ables proved to be significant correlates of authoritarianism and the cognitive 
political involvement variables. Older respondents (r = .22, p < .01), the lower 
educated (r = -.23, p < .01) and lower socio-economic strata (r = -.12, p < .01) 
were more authoritarian than the younger, educated and wealthier participants. 
In a similar vein, general political interest is positively correlated with education 
(r = .17, p < .01), age (r = .13, p < .01) and income (r = .10, p < .01). Older (r = .17, 
p < .01), more educated (r = .13, p < .01) and more well-off citizens (r = .07, p < 
.01) were more prone to campaign following as well. Finally, education (r = .28, 
p < .01) and income (r = .17, p < .01) were positively correlated with political 
knowledge. There is no significant correlation between age and the overall politi-
cal knowledge score (r = -.01, p = .76). However, some of the individual political 
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information questions were significantly correlated with age. Older respondents 
were somewhat better in answering the question about the finance minister (r = 
.09, p < .01), but the younger were more correct about the unemployment rate (r 
= -.07, p < .01). Hence, there may be a specific affinity between age and knowledge 
of political information in specific areas. For younger people information about 
unemployment might be more relevant, for instance. 
Table 1
Summary of intercorrelations, means and standard deviations for the political 
variables included in the analysis
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Partial 
r
M SD M
SE
1. Authoritarianism -0.03 1.02 0.02
2. Political knowledge score -.16** -.13** 1.78 1.16 0.03
3. Q. 1 (Finance 
Minister)
-.08** .66** -.09** 0.44 0.49 0.01
4. Q. 2 (Unemployment 
rate)
-.09** .46** .11** -.07* 0.17 0.38 0.01
5. Q. 3 (2nd party in 
election)
-.10** .66** .20** .12** -.08* 0.58 0.49 0.01
6. Q. 4 (UN Secretary 
General)
-.13** .68** .25** .09** .27** -.09** 0.58 0.49 0.01
7. Interest in politics -.03 .29** .21** .08** .20** .21** -.03 2.15 0.88 0.02
8. Interest in election 
campaign 
.01 .30** .19** .08** .25** .20** .65** -.01 2.21 0.83 0.02
Note. Column Partial r presents the correlation coefficients between authoritari-
anism and political variables, controlled for age, education, and income.
**p < .01. *p < .05.
An important implication of these significant relationships between socio-
demographic variables, authoritarianism, and political variables is that the influ-
ence of socio-demographic variables should be controlled for. Still, as shown in 
Table 1, controlling for the influence of the socio-demographic variables did not 
affect the previously observed relationships much. Correlation coefficients be-
tween authoritarianism and political knowledge remained significant and nega-
tive (although slightly lower in intensity). The correlation between authoritarian-
ism and general and specific political interest remained non-significant.
Finally, we inspected the relationship between authoritarianism and political 
knowledge in more scrutiny and compared the level of authoritarianism between 
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three political knowledge groups of respondents – those who were informed, mis-
informed and uninformed. On the first, F(2, 1456) = 5.63, p < .01, η2 = .01, second, 
F(2, 1456) = 5.62, p < .01, η2 = .01, third, F(2, 1456) = 6.96, p < .01, η2 = .01, and 
fourth knowledge question, F(2, 1456) = 12.59, p < .01, η2 = .02 the differences 
in authoritarianism between those who gave correct, incorrect and “don’t know” 
answers are significant. As can be seen in Figure 1, those who gave the correct 
answer to each question are, on the average, the groups lowest in authoritarian-
ism. Yet, the post-hoc tests revealed that the differences occurred mainly between 
those who gave correct answers on one side, and those who gave incorrect or 
don’t know answers on the other (mean difference significant at .05 level in every 
case). In neither case, the mean differences between the misinformed and unin-
formed group proved to be significant. 
Figure 1. The average level of authoritarianism (with the 95% CI) for the three 
political knowledge groups on four questions of the political knowledge test.
Similarly, the differences in authoritarianism between those who gave only 
correct (informed type), only incorrect (misinformed type) and only “don’t know” 
(uninformed type) answers on each question were analysed as well (see Figure 
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2). Although the number of respondents included in this analysis decrease dra-
matically (92 informed, 14 misinformed and 62 uninformed respondents in total), 
three groups of respondents still differ significantly in authoritarianism, F(2, 166) 
= 9.80, p < .01, η2 = .11. 
Figure 2. The average level of authoritarianism (with the 95% confidence inter-
vals) for the three political knowledge groups.
The informed group is, on the average, lowest on authoritarianism, while the 
misinformed group obtained the highest authoritarianism scores. However, the 
post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between the informed and misin-
formed respondents (p < .05), as well as between the informed and uninformed 
ones (p < .01). Still, the difference in authoritarianism between the two less politi-
cally sophisticated groups, the misinformed and uniformed, does not gain signifi-
cance (p = .69). In other words, the view that the higher authoritarian persons are 
more inclined to erroneously guess an answer than to simply say “don’t know” is 
not supported by our data.
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Discussion
The results of this study have shown that persons who are higher on authori-
tarianism tend to be less politically knowledgeable. This is quite in line with the 
limited empirical evidence obtained on smaller, student samples and in different 
socio-cultural contexts (Peterson et al., 2002). Since the data for the present study 
were collected from the general public, i.e., respondents diverse in age, educa-
tional and income levels, and in a different political and cultural context, the link 
between authoritarianism and political knowledge seems robust, although of 
modest magnitude. It also proved that the link cannot be considered spurious, 
since it remained virtually unaffected after introducing the basic socio-economic 
controls.
Such findings support the theories that describe authoritarian individuals 
as tending towards political ignorance. Whether authoritarianism is associated 
with cognitive rigidity (Adorno et al., 1950), cognitive “shortcomings” (Altemeyer, 
1996), identified as a part of a rigid construct system (Peterson et al., 2002) or a 
dogmatic world-view (Rokeach, 1960), it seems that the less accurate knowledge 
of politics accompanies higher authoritarianism. The question of the direction of 
influence, however, remains open. In the original conception, authoritarianism 
was treated as a personality trait, with deeply-seated, subconscious motivation, 
where avoidance of information inconsistent with adopted beliefs is psychologi-
cally adaptive. 
Subsequent research found that authoritarianism indeed correlates with 
various relevant psychological variables – dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), openness 
to experience (Peterson et al., 1997), the personal need for structure (Altemeyer, 
1998) or the need for cognitive closure (Chirumbolo, 2001) (for a comprehensive 
overview, see Jost et al., 2003), all describing the tendencies of a person high on 
authoritarianism to seek certainty (i.e. avoid uncertainty), cling to familiar, arrive 
at premature conclusions and impose rigid categories and stereotypes. New piec-
es of information bring changes or call into question the established knowledge 
structures, which those seeking certainty urge to escape.
In a similar vein, lower knowledge on politics in general terms could be the re-
sult of a tendency of those higher on authoritarianism to neglect information criti-
cal to legitimate political authority (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Cohrs 
& Moschner, 2002). This interpretation would not apply to the present findings, 
though. The included measures of political knowledge are ideologically neutral, 
and therefore should not resonate especially with high authoritarianism. The idea 
that there may be some specific knowledge domains in which those higher on au-
thoritarianism outperform those who are lower remains for the future research.
Contrary to the initial expectations, authoritarianism proved unrelated to the 
political interest variables. The included political interest variables represent an 
overall cognitive orientation towards the world of politics. Although originally de-
scribed as a personality-related determinant of ideological preferences (Adorno 
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et al., 1950), authoritarianism does not seem to have a prominent motivational 
potential in political terms. There are no differences in the authoritarianism level 
among those who are interested and those disinterested in politics in Serbia. This 
is different from Peterson et al. (2002), where in both of their student samples 
they found that authoritarianism “was significantly negatively related to personal 
interest in politics” (p. 104). As elaborated in the introductory part, the predic-
tions about the relationships between authoritarianism and political interest 
were tentative. The bulk of theoretical arguments lead to an expectation of lower 
interest among highly authoritarian individuals. This, for instance, could be due 
to their lower openness to experience (e.g., McCrae, 1996). Yet, the expectation is 
not borne out. The hypothesis, proposed by Peterson et al. (2002), that it may be 
due to biased samples not containing the sufficient number of highly authoritar-
ian individuals is not applicable here. The present sample was designed to be na-
tionally representative of adult citizens of Serbia. Besides, interest and knowledge 
should be interrelated – a prominent interest should lead to greater knowledge and vice versa. Yet, authoritarianism is significantly related to political knowledge, 
but not to political interest. It could imply that the interested authoritarians gravi-
tate towards the less informative sources of news and information.
Some alternative hypotheses will be offered here, one methodological and 
another contextual. The political interest variables, unlike the political informa-
tion questions, are subjective, self-assessment variables. Hence, political interest 
answers might be subject to various influences, such as, for instance, social de-
sirability. In particular, authoritarian individuals, being conventional, might feel 
more pressure to provide socially desirable answers (being interested in politics), 
and therefore directly affect the relationship examined here.
Another possibility is that expressions of political interest are affected by the 
political context. The survey was conducted some 6−7 months after the elections. 
In a study conducted some time before the 2012 elections in Serbia, it had been 
found that the supporters of the Serbian Progressive Party, the national conserva-
tive party that won the elections, were highest on authoritarianism (Kuzmanović, 
2010). Hence, after the elections, the satisfaction with political life was probably 
higher among the more authoritarian individuals. At the time of the survey, those 
relatively lower on authoritarianism might have felt disappointed in the election 
outcome and the post-election developments, and therefore expressed lower 
political interest than otherwise. For instance, the previously ruling Democratic 
Party collapsed after the elections, and split into several fractions, thus providing 
a bleak political perspective for those who previously supported them.
The two factors are interrelated – the subjective character of the variable 
makes it more susceptible to the influence of the political context. We would sug-
gest that these issues be addressed in future research since subjective political 
interest variables are often used in comparative research. This is somewhat dif-
ferent from the argument that in politically quiet times authoritarians are in their 
“normal”, politically apathetic state and the feeling of threat would mobilize them 
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(Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991). The point advocated here is that certain socio-
political conditions may have leveled up the expected relationship. Those low on 
authoritarianism may have expressed a lack of interest in politics, leveling off the 
differences in political interest in regard to authoritarianism. 
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AUTORITARNOST I POLITIČKA KOGNICIJA
U radu se analizira veza između autoritarnosti i političke kognicije, 
operacionalizovane preko tri indikatora: politička informisanost, 
opšte interesovanje za politiku, i zainteresovanost za izbornu 
kampanju. Polazi se od hipoteze da su osobe sa višim stepenom 
autoritarnosti slabije politički informisane i manje zainteresovane 
za politiku, što proizilazi iz njhovog izrazitijeg otpora novim infor-
macijama i menjanju usvojenih stavova. Ova hipoteza proizilazi 
iz klasičnog pisa autoritarne ličnosti, ali do sada nije adekvatno 
empirijski proverena. Podaci dolaze iz post-izbornog istraživanja 
javnog mnenja, sprovedenog nakon predsedničkih i parlamentar-
nih izbora 2012. godine. Anketirano je 1568 građana Srbije, oda-
branih metodom slučajnog izbora. Rezultati pokazuju da je auto-
ritarnost u negativnoj korelaciji sa političkom informisanošću. S 
druge strane, opšta politička zainteresovanost i zainteresovanost 
za izbornu kampanju nisu u korelaciji sa nivoom autoritarnosti. 
Ove asocijacije su stabilne i nakon uvođenja statističke kontro-
le za osnovne socio-demografske variable. Dodatno poređenje 
pogrešno informisanih i neinformisanih grupa ispitnika (onih koji 
su dali pogrešne odgovore, i onih koji su odgovorili da ne znaju 
tačan odgovor) nije dalo podršku viđenju da su autoritarne osobe 
sklonije pogađanju odgovora nego tome da jednostavno odgovo-
re da ne znaju. Analiza je zaključena tezom da je veza između 
autoritarnosti i političke informisanosti zasnovana na dubljim psi-
hološkim procesima, dok je veza (odnosno nedostatak veze) sa 
interesovanjem za politiku više pod uticajem političkog konteksta.
Ključne reči: autoritarnost, politička informisanost, zainteresova-
nost za politiku, Srbija 
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Appendix A
Table A
Authoritarianism Scale: Factor loadings on the first principal component
Loadings
The most important virtues a child has to learn are obedience and 
respect for authority.
.70
Young people sometimes have rebellious thoughts, but as they grow 
up, they should condemn these and adapt.
.58
Immoral conditions in our country are partly due to the fact that 
both teachers and parents forgot that physical punishment is still 
the best way of upbringing.
.50
It would be better for everyone if the authorities censored the 
newspapers and films and other media so that rubbish be kept away 
from the youth.
.69
Most of our social problems would be solved if we got rid of the 
immoral and pervert persons.
.69
People can be divided into two groups: the strong and the weak. .52
Note. Extraction method − Principal Component Analysis; 38.18% of the explained 
variance.
